Alma 49


 



MDC Contents

 

 

 Alma 49:1

1  And now it came to pass in the eleventh month of the nineteenth year, on the tenth day of the month, the armies of the Lamanites were seen approaching towards the land of Ammonihah.

 

Geographic: Of course we have seen a Lamanite attack on Ammonihah before. In the lightning raid carried out after the expulsion of the Anti-Nephi-Lehies from the land of Nephi, the target was Ammonihah. The hypothesis presented at that time was that this was a relatively quick target, even though in the more northern parts of Nephite territory because it was approachable from a shore march that kept away from the rest of the Nephite cities. It would appear that this approach did not change in the few years between these two incidents. It is also quite probable that with the success of the first raid on Ammonihah, it would have been presumed that this second approach at that same location might have been equally successful.

 

Of the general layout of this approach to Nephite territory, Sorenson suggests:

 

“Around 80 B.C. just after Alma’s experience there, “the Lamanites had come in upon the wilderness side, into the borders of the land, even into the city of Ammonihah” (Alma 16:2) and destroyed it. Nine years later they came in by the same route, expecting easy pickings against the partially rebuilt city (Alma 49:1-3). In both cases, it is clear, the Lamanite force had journeyed from the land of Nephi northward along the coastal wilderness strip “on the west of Zarahemla” (Alma 22:28); the Nephites never defended that zone, it seems. (They probably never even occupied it seriously, for their record mentions no settlement, no event there.) When the attackers got far enough northward, they “went over into the borders of the land of Zarahemla, and fell upon the people who were in the land of Ammonihah” (Alma 25:2). The “over” is precisely correct, for they would have had to cross the western wilderness chain of mountains from the coast to get to Ammonihah, the first major city they came to on the main route… The fit of text to terrain would be difficult to improve.” (John L. Sorenson. An Ancient American Setting for the Book of Mormon. FARMS 1985, p. 203).

 

Social: It may seem too simplistic to note, but it is still important to note that they Nephites calculated time on the basis of at least three divisions of time, the year, month, and day. We have numbered months and numbered day. The Nephites may or may not have had month names as we do, but there is never any indication of them if they did. Similarly, they may or may not have had day names.

 

It is also possible that the Nephites used a seven day week as a unit of time measurement, though the evidence for this is limited, and there is the possibility that the evidence is misleading.

 

The brass plates certainly had the record of the seven days of creation that formed the basis of the Israelite conception of the seven day week. We know that Mosiah knew of the seven day week from that source (if no where else) because he references it in his reprise of the ten commandments:

 

Mosiah 13:17-20

17 Six days shalt thou labor, and do all thy work;

18 But the seventh day, the sabbath of the Lord thy God, thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, thy man-servant, nor thy maid-servant, nor thy cattle, nor thy stranger that is within thy gates;

 

We have three more uses of the term “week” in the Book of Mormon:

 

Mosiah 18:25

25 And there was one day in every week that was set apart that they should gather themselves together to teach the people, and to worship the Lord their God, and also, as often as it was in their power, to assemble themselves together.

 

Alma 31:12

12 Now, when they had come into the land, behold, to their astonishment they found that the Zoramites had built synagogues, and that they did gather themselves together on one day of the week, which day they did call the day of the Lord; and they did worship after a manner which Alma and his brethren had never beheld;

 

Alma 32:11

11 And moreover, I would ask, do ye suppose that ye must not worship God only once in a week?

 

Of these three, the two from Alma 31 refer to the same situation, and an intriguing one because it comes from the Apostate Zoramites. It would appear, however, that rather than a completely apostate idea, the concept of meeting once a “week” to worship God is really a Nephite tradition, since we see it in Mosiah as well.

 

What is difficult to tell is whether or not what we see as “week” in the Book of Mormon meant the same thing to the Nephites as it does to us. It certainly could, since the Nephites had both a tradition from the Old World and the brass plates to suggest a seven-day week. The only thing that might counter the probability of the continuation of this pattern would be the competing calendars of the non-Nephite world. The only evidence that might suggest that the seven day week did not hold the same meaning for the Nephites as it did in the Old World (or the modern world) is that the number seven does not appear to be significant in the Book of Mormon. In Israelite symbology, the seven creative periods fostered a large number of symbolic number references based on the number seven. Any computer search of the Old or New Testaments for “seven” or “seventh” will indicate a large number of times when that number appears, and typically in situations where it is symbolic rather than a count. On the other hand, seven only appears in the Book of Mormon in counts. The lack of symbolic use of the number seven suggests that there was a conceptual break with the Old World symbol system, and this was one of the casualties. The other explanation for the lack of sevens in the Book of Mormon is that the entire text appears to be relatively devoid of symbol numbers. Most numbers in the Book of Mormon appear as some form of count.

 

It is just possible that the “week” shows up in the text because it was one of Joseph Smith’s assumptions in translation, a process that we have seen before. However, since there is clear indication that they knew of, and endorsed, the brass plates that did clearly indicate the seven-day week, the safest assumption is that it was continued in Nephite society, even though it was absent from the surrounding cultures.

 

Alma 49:2

2  And behold, the city had been rebuilt, and Moroni had stationed an army by the borders of the city, and they had cast up dirt round about to shield them from the arrows and the stones of the Lamanites; for behold, they fought with stones and with arrows.

Alma 49:3

3  Behold, I said that the city of Ammonihah had been rebuilt. I say unto you, yea, that it was in part rebuilt; and because the Lamanites had destroyed it once because of the iniquity of the people, they supposed that it would again become an easy prey for them.

Alma 49:4

4  But behold, how great was their disappointment; for behold, the Nephites had dug up a ridge of earth round about them, which was so high that the Lamanites could not cast their stones and their arrows at them that they might take effect, neither could they come upon them save it was by their place of entrance.

 

When the Lamanites arrive at Ammonihah they find that they city has been “in part rebuilt” (verse 3). This suggests that Ammonihah has not returned to its status as a major city-state, but is rather now a strategic position. Certainly there would be a local population at that place, but Moroni apparently understood the vulnerability of that particular entrance point to the land of Zarahemla. With his understanding, he not only partially rebuilt the city, but the rebuilding took the form of significant additions to the defensive capabilities of the city.

 

The description of the conflict at this particular location fits into the types of conflicts we see in Mesoamerica. First is the description of the defensive position as being a wall of dirt. This is a known defensive tactic for several Mesoamerican cities. Jeremy Sabloff describes the earthen fortifications around Tikal:

 

“Surveys of the more peripheral areas surrounding Tikal shattered the traditional persception of the Classic maya as a basically peaceful people… Ditches running along long, narrow, artificial ridges, or parapets, were found approxsimately 8 kilomters to the south of the site center and 4.5 kilometers to the north, between Tikal and the large neighboring site of Uaxactun. The ditches and parapets ran for a total length of more than 9 kilometers. The Tikal archaeologists, particularly Dennis Puleston, suggested that these works had been used to defend Tikal from attack. (Jeremy A. Sabloff. The New Archaeology and the Ancient Maya. Scientific American Library, 1990, pp. 84-5).

 

In addition to the authentic description of the earthen fortifications, the references to stones are arrows accurately reflects the long-range military weapons of the day (see Ross Hassig. Aztec Warfare. University of Oklahoma Press, 1988, pp. 75-80).

 

Alma 49:5

5  Now at this time the chief captains of the Lamanites were astonished exceedingly, because of the wisdom of the Nephites in preparing their places of security.

Alma 49:6

6  Now the leaders of the Lamanites had supposed, because of the greatness of their numbers, yea, they supposed that they should be privileged to come upon them as they had hitherto done; yea, and they had also prepared themselves with shields, and with breastplates; and they had also prepared themselves with garments of skins, yea, very thick garments to cover their nakedness.

Alma 49:7

7  And being thus prepared they supposed that they should easily overpower and subject their brethren to the yoke of bondage, or slay and massacre them according to their pleasure.

Alma 49:8

8  But behold, to their uttermost astonishment, they were prepared for them, in a manner which never had been known among the children of Lehi.  Now they were prepared for the Lamanites, to battle after the manner of the instructions of Moroni.

Alma 49:9

9  And it came to pass that the Lamanites, or the Amalickiahites, were exceedingly astonished at their manner of preparation for war.

 

Mormon takes evident pleasure in describing the consternation of the Lamanites. While the import of these passages is to show that the Lamanite incursion did not succeed because of Moroni’s fortifications, there are other tidbits of information that we can learn from these verses.

 

The first is that the Lamanites are clearly not stupid. They had been beaten back in the attack on Jershon because of the Nephite innovation of armor. They took note of that innovation, and clearly replicated that innovation. In verse 6 we now see the Lamanites with a different set of military dress. Just as the Nephites, they are now “prepared… with shields, and with breastplates; and they had also prepared themselves with garments of skins, yea, very thick garments to cover their nakedness.” The Lamanites who had surrendered to Moroni might have kept their promise not to fight, but there was no promise that they wouldn’t divulge the Nephite “secret” of body armor. This rapid diffusion of a military technological advance was very typical in the limited technology available in Mesoamerica (Ross Hassig. Aztec Warfare. University of Oklahoma Press, 1988, p. 92).

 

The second thing we learn is that fortifications were also an innovation. It is perhaps another reason that Mormon so admired Moroni, because Moroni was not simply a leader of men, he appears to have been a brilliant innovator, one whose innovations appear to have altered the course of military history in Mesoamerican thereafter, as the items which appear as innovations with Moroni become normal for later armies and cities.

 

Alma 49:10

10  Now, if king Amalickiah had come down out of the land of Nephi, at the head of his army, perhaps he would have caused the Lamanites to have attacked the Nephites at the city of Ammonihah; for behold, he did care not for the blood of his people.

Alma 49:11

11  But behold, Amalickiah did not come down himself to battle.  And behold, his chief captains durst not attack the Nephites at the city of Ammonihah, for Moroni had altered the management of affairs among the Nephites, insomuch that the Lamanites were disappointed in their places of retreat and they could not come upon them.

 

We do not know where Mormon gets his opinion of the way Amalickiah would have pressed the attack. When we do see Amalickiah leading an invasion in chapter 51 we have no indication of this type of foolhardy behavior. Perhaps there is information on Amalickiah’s invasion that is not written in Mormon’s text, because Amalickiah does conquer several cities that are fortified as was Ammonihah (Alma 51:26-27). It is possible that the attacks on those cities were documented in the sources and included a lost price of life to conquer those cities. That information Mormon leaves out of his narration, and leaves just this one mention of Amalickiah’s disdain for the life of his warriors. The Lamanite commander of this invasion is repelled by the defenses, and decides to attempt his incursion in a different location.

 

In verse 11 we have the interesting statement that “Moroni had altered the management of affairs among the Nephites….”  We are left to deduce what it was that Moroni had altered in the “management” of the affairs of the Nephites. Since the result of his alteration in management is a fairly uniform set of defenses for different cities, it would appear that one of the things that Moroni is able to do is provide a much more dominant central authority over the cities that were part of the Zarahemlaite hegemony. We have seen much independence in those cities in past chapters dealing with their religion. We must assume that all of their affairs were similarly only loosely related to Zarahemla. In this case, however, we have Moroni exerting sufficient centralized influence as to create uniform defenses. In addition to the defenses that could be seen as enlightened self-interest on the part of the cities, Moroni’s entire program of defense required a unified vision of the land that would appear to be a new concept for the land of Zarahemla.

 

It is no wonder that Mormon had tremendous respect for Moroni, for his innovations and tactical brilliance were wide ranging, with the innovations ranging from the individual soldier’s protective gear to the protective “gear” for multiple cities. On top of those innovations, he appears to have been able to pull together a central authority in a region that has shown little indication of a desire to obey a centralized authority. As we will see as the story of this war develops, Moroni’s position on what might be termed a national level was perhaps even more secure than that of the Chief Judge over that same land or nation.

 

Alma 49:12

12  Therefore they retreated into the wilderness, and took their camp and marched towards the land of Noah, supposing that to be the next best place for them to come against the Nephites.

Alma 49:13

13  For they knew not that Moroni had fortified, or had built forts of security, for every city in all the land round about; therefore, they marched forward to the land of Noah with a firm determination; yea, their chief captains came forward and took an oath that they would destroy the people of that city.

 

When the Lamanite leader regroups, he heads for a location that he assumes will be an easier target. His information on these weaker points would have come from the Zoramites in his command (if he was not himself a Zoramite) since the Zoramites had been placed in important positions in this army precisely because they should have know the weaknesses of the Nephite cities (Alma 48:5). Moroni has thwarted this insider information by changing the physical defenses of cities, and by reworking the lines of defense.

 

Hugh Nibley’s experience in the military intelligence community gave him a unique perspective on Moroni. In particular, he notes the similarity of Moroni’s defensive scheme to modern concepts:

 

“Moroni's defenses were based on a series of strong points, being a defense in depth, as modern defense-lines are; beside specially placed "small forts, or places of resort," towns and cities on the line were also converted into strong points (Alma 48:8). Such an arrangement can take the momentum out of any military steamroller and slow down or stop any attacking force, no matter how formidable, by forcing it to reduce one strong place after another or else bypass the fortifications and thereby leave dangerous enemy forces in its rear to disrupt communications and launch harassing counter-attacks on invading units.” (Hugh Nibley, Since Cumorah, 2nd ed. [Salt Lake City and Provo: Deseret Book Co., Foundation for Ancient Research and Mormon Studies, 1988], 306.)

 

Alma 49:14

14  But behold, to their astonishment, the city of Noah, which had hitherto been a weak place, had now, by the means of Moroni, become strong, yea, even to exceed the strength of the city Ammonihah.

Alma 49:15

15  And now, behold, this was wisdom in Moroni; for he had supposed that they would be frightened at the city Ammonihah; and as the city of Noah had hitherto been the weakest part of the land, therefore they would march thither to battle; and thus it was according to his desires.

 

Nibley further comments on the military genius of Moroni:

 

“The supreme test of generalship, we are told, is to have the enemy play your game, making just the moves you want him to make under the impression that he is being very smart on his own. Moroni did just that, and the attack on the city of Noah "was according to his desires" (Alma 49:15). (Hugh Nibley, Since Cumorah, 2nd ed. [Salt Lake City and Provo: Deseret Book Co., Foundation for Ancient Research and Mormon Studies, 1988], 308.)

 

Geographic/Military: The incursion now moves away from Ammonihah toward Noah. The previous intelligence from the Zoramites suggested that this city would have been an easy target, but they find that instead of easy pickings there is a city that is “strong, yea, even to exceed the strength of the city of Ammonihah.” Rather than move on as he did when he faced Ammonihah, the Lamanite general chooses to attack Noah. There are several things we need to understand about this sequence of events.

 

In the general geography of the land according to Sorenson’s correlation, we have Ammonihah as the city strategically located at a passage from the coast over into the valley of the Sidon. After bypassing Ammonihah, Noah is the next city in line. The logic of the progression is certainly consistent. The Lamanite general skips one city and moves to the next. What we now must explain is why the Lamanite general would leave a fortified city at his rear. This should have exposed the rear of his army to attack and created the possibility of a two front battle, which he would not have wanted.

 

It would appear that the intent of the Lamanites was a rapid incursion into the valley of the Sidon, and an attack on the heartland of the land of Zarahemla. In the canons of Mesoamerican warfare, if they were to conquer the central city, the entire hegemony would disintegrate and they would be victorious even if they had not conquered each individual city. Thus the Lamanite general would have by-passed Ammonihah under the assumption that his progress into the more important parts of the land would be sufficiently rapid that he would not have to worry about his rear.

 

This plan hit a big snag at Noah. It appears that Moroni anticipated the probable intent of an invading army, and perhaps understood that the first city could be passed. What Moroni does is make Noah the strong defensive point. What we now must understand is why a Lamanite general who left off attack on a weaker defensive position now attempts to attack a stronger one.

 

This certainly would not have been his preference had he know when he reached Ammonihah that Noah would be fortified. Now that he has made the decision to move inland he is faced with three options. He can skip Noah and move on, he can attack, or he can retreat. Military men do not think of retreat as a first option. This would be particularly true since this was an extensive army. Moving on might have been acceptable in light of the blitzkrieg style incursion he apparently had planned, but having found an two unexpectedly fortified cities, he could not be confident that further into the heart of the land of Zarahemla he would not find even more such dangerous surprises. The further into Nephite territory he pressed, the more the rear of his army would be opened to attack from the strongholds he had passed. The Lamanite general stops to fight at Noah because he realizes that moving forward was really no option at all, and the only alternative was to simply give up and leave. He presses the battle.

 

Alma 49:16

16  And behold, Moroni had appointed Lehi to be chief captain over the men  of that city; and it was that same Lehi who fought with the Lamanites in the valley on the east of the river Sidon.

 

Mormon tells us who the captain of Noah is because he wants us to know that he is one of the most trusted by Moroni. As the one who captained the surprise force in the earlier battle, he is clearly someone to whom Moroni entrusted a major tactical portion of a battle that had to work correctly. This is further indication that Moroni correctly interpreted the Lamanite action at Ammonihah. We have Mormon’s statement that the by-passing of Ammonihah and the march on Noah was just what Moroni wanted, and the presence of such an important general in Noah (as opposed to Ammonihah) indicates that this truly was Moroni’s plan. Not only were the fortifications better at Noah, but the leadership was the best Moroni could concentrate in a single city.

 

Alma 49:17

17  And now behold it came to pass, that when the Lamanites had found that Lehi commanded the city they were again disappointed, for they feared Lehi exceedingly; nevertheless their chief captains had sworn with an oath to attack the city; therefore, they brought up their armies.

 

Social: It is fascinating that the Lamanite army should both know that Lehi was commander of Noah, and that he was the very same who had assisted in the Lamanite defeat in the battle on the east of the Sidon. This recognition is best explained by the personal nature of Mesoamerican warfare, and the tendency of those armies to clearly mark the general. At least in later Mesoamerican armies for which data are available, the general would have been marked visually, either by costume or by the banners flying at his position. Thus they armies would have known Lehi visually, not personally. To know that he was at Noah, all he needed to do was show himself in his unique battle dress. Those who could not see his face, those who did not know his name, nevertheless would know him because they knew the visual markers that identified him.

 

In spite of the fortifications and the presence of a feared general, the Lamanites press the attack. Nibley refers to their oath as a “true Prussian officers' oath.” (Hugh Nibley, Since Cumorah, 2nd ed. [Salt Lake City and Provo: Deseret Book Co., Foundation for Ancient Research and Mormon Studies, 1988], 308.) The oath was taken because of the importance of the location, and not for any desire for self destruction. As noted above, having by-passed Ammonihah the military imperative was to take Noah or abandon the effort. The Lamanites chose to not only attack, but to attack with fervor and purpose.

 

Alma 49:18

18  Now behold, the Lamanites could not get into their forts of security by any other way save by the entrance, because of the highness of the bank which had been thrown up, and the depth of the ditch which had been dug round about, save it were by the entrance.

 

The Nephite fortifications consist of two aspects. The first is the mound of dirt. This places the defenders at a higher position with their projective weapons aided by gravity in their path. The second is the ditch or dry moat around the fortification. The effect of the ditch is to not only increase the size of the height of the wall, but to create a difference in footing near the wall which would require an enemy to pay attention to his feet near the point of attack instead of only concentrating on the target.

 

The archaeological site of Becan has a defensive system that combines parapet and ditch in just the type of combination that is described for Noah. The possibility was examined that the ditch was simply an artifact of building projects, but it shows signs that it was a conscious construction and not simply a convenient location for the dirt used in construction:

 

“Webster argues that given the local geology, the ditch would not have been and effective means of quarrying. Moreover, much more material was removed from the ditch than could have been used in any construction project at the site. Finally, materials from the ditch were piled up on the inside lip of excavation to form an embankment but not on the outside lip, which would have been expected if the ditch had simply been a borrow pit.” (Jeremy A. Sabloff. The New Archaeology and the Ancient Maya. Scientific American Library, 1990, pp. 87).

 

Alma 49:19

19  And thus were the Nephites prepared to destroy all such as should attempt to climb up to enter the fort by any other way, by casting over stones and arrows at them.

Alma 49:20

20  Thus they were prepared, yea, a body of their strongest men, with their swords and their slings, to smite down all who should attempt to come into their place of security by the place of entrance; and thus were they prepared to defend themselves against the Lamanites.

 

Here we have an accurate description of the tactical value of different weapons. From the walls the weapons of choice were stones and arrows. As we have already noted, both arrows and stones were part of the Mesoamerican army’s standard complement of weapons. In this defensive context the stones need not have been used with slings, though certainly they would have been as the army approached the walls. The arrows in Mesoamerican warfare were typically launched from an atatl rather than a bow. The physical action of launching both the stones and the arrows is accurately described by “casting over.”

 

There were other troops with different weapons, but the text indicates that they have a different function and place. Those with the swords are placed to guard the locations where there is a greater likelihood of personal combat. Even these, however, have a protective force of slingers with them to harry the approaching army before the reach the swords of the waiting men.

 

The descriptions of the uses of the personnel and the types of weapons and combination of weapons is an accurate depiction of the way such weapons would have been used.

 

Alma 49:21

21  And it came to pass that the captains of the Lamanites brought up their armies before the place of entrance, and began to contend with the Nephites, to get into their place of security; but behold, they were driven back from time to time, insomuch that they were slain with an immense slaughter.

 

Of course the entrance to the city would have to be an easier approach than over the walls because the residents of the city would have to enter and leave. The entrance was always the potential weak point of the defense of a walled city. This entrance is logically a relatively narrow opening in the walls, and thus an attacking army who would storm that location is forced into a smaller front where the troops that can be brought to bear on that point are few in number, even if they may be easily replaced. The defenders would use the slings to begin the defense as the army approached, and then the swords would take up the close combat. The defenders are also concentrated at the front, but those at the rear actually may have some rest. In hand to hand combat fatigue was frequently a decisive factor in the battle, and the defenders would have fresh men. The attackers, on the other hand would be harried from above as well as from the front at the entrance, so there were fewer of their troops who could have a reprieve. They would be involved in attempting to defend themselves even before they were in a position to use their own weapons. The result of this rush on the entrance was “an immense slaughter.”

 

Alma 49:22

22  Now when they found that they could not obtain power over the Nephites by the pass, they began to dig down their banks of earth that they might obtain a pass to their armies, that they might have an equal chance to fight; but behold, in these attempts they were swept off by the stones and arrows which were thrown at them; and instead of filling up their ditches by pulling down the banks of earth, they were filled up in a measure with their dead and wounded bodies.

 

While the experience of attacking a fortified city is apparently new to the Lamanites, they begin to learn what all other armies had learned, and that was that the attack would be long process. The entrance was sufficiently well defended that attack through that point was hopeless. What then became the concentration was to remove the dirt walls so that there was a larger breach in the defenses where the greater numbers of the Lamanite army could be brought to bear.

 

This attack on the walls was also one of the methods of defeat of a fortified city, but it comes only at the high cost of life, as the Lamanites found. Just as the attack on then entrance is repulsed, so too is the attack on the walls. The strategic advantage of having a protective barrier in front of the defenders, and the comparative advantage of gravity which would increase the force of the defenders missiles and weaken the force of those of the attackers which were launched upwards all had the effect of continuing the slaughter of the Lamanite army.

 

Alma 49:23

23  Thus the Nephites had all power over their enemies; and thus the Lamanites did attempt to destroy the Nephites until their chief captains were all slain; yea, and more than a thousand of the Lamanites were slain; while, on the other hand, there was not a single soul of the Nephites which was slain.

 

We have the impression that this army of the Lamanites was very large, but the casualties listed are only a thousand. Of course a thousand men is a large number, but it was certainly not the bulk of this Lamanite army. What was the telling turning point is the death of all of the chief captains. In the way Mesoamerican wars were fought, the loss of these captains would be the signal for defeat, and would have been sufficient to call off the attack.

 

Alma 49:24

24  There were about fifty who were wounded, who had been exposed to the arrows of the Lamanites through the pass, but they were shielded by their shields, and their breastplates, and their head-plates, insomuch that their wounds were upon their legs, many of which were very severe.

 

Mormon gives us this information to contrast the slaughter of a thousand Lamanites (with certainly a large number of wounded) with the lack of any Nephite death and only fifty wounded. This great disparity in casualties shows the superiority of the Nephite position, something that would have been quite impressive to Mormon, a military man in his own right.

 

What is interesting is that it is noted that the unprotected legs were the locations of the injuries. This is not only an accurate depiction of the vulnerable points in hand to hand combat, but it also strongly suggests that these wounded were from the fighting at the entrance, since that appears to have been the only point at which such hand to hand fighting had taken place. Those on the walls would have had their legs protected by the earthen wall, or perhaps wooden stakes in the top of the wall, which were added for further protection.

 

Alma 49:25

25  And it came to pass, that when the Lamanites saw that their chief captains were all slain they fled into the wilderness.  And it came to pass that they returned to the land of Nephi, to inform their king, Amalickiah, who was a Nephite by birth, concerning their great loss.

 

The importance of the chief captains is explicitly stated here. When did the battle end? - with the death of the chief captains. When the “Lamanites saw that their chief captains were all slain,” they broke off fighting and fled. This is precisely the type of action we expect from a Mesoamerican army.

 

Alma 49:26

26  And it came to pass that he was exceedingly angry with his people, because he had not obtained his desire over the Nephites; he had not subjected them to the yoke of bondage.

Alma 49:27

27  Yea, he was exceedingly wroth, and he did curse God, and also Moroni, swearing with an oath that he would drink his blood; and this because Moroni had kept the commandments of God in preparing for the safety of his people.

Alma 49:28

28  And it came to pass, that on the other hand, the people of Nephi did thank the Lord their God, because of his matchless power in delivering them from the hands of their enemies.

 

These passages should be read together because they are meant to provide a contrast. We have the contrast of the angry Amalickiah because of the defeat and the grateful Nephites for their victory. Mormon does not attribute the victory to Moroni here, though he clearly appreciates Moroni’s genius. Rather, Mormon highlights the most important aspect of the defensive preparations for the nature of the text he is writing. He notes that the people were righteous, and this righteousness resulted in the blessing from God.

 

Alma 49:29

29  And thus ended the nineteenth year of the reign of the judges over the people of Nephi.

Alma 49:30

30  Yea, and there was continual peace among them, and exceedingly great prosperity in the church because of their heed and diligence which they gave unto the word of God, which was declared unto them by Helaman, and Shiblon, and Corianton, and Ammon and his brethren, yea, and by all those who had been ordained by the holy order of God, being baptized unto repentance, and sent forth to preach among the people.

 

Mormon uses the term ‘continual peace’ rather loosely. It denotes absence of attack by the Lamanites, and absence of internal dissension. The “continual” aspect does not appear to have to last for any particular length of time, and this peace will not last long.

 

Before Mormon continues his story, he ends this section by noting the good rather than the conflict. Rather than concentrate on the military, he ends with reference to the sons of Alma and the sons of Mosiah who preach the word of God. This is the essential point that Mormon will be making during all of this description of war. When the people were righteous, miracles happened, and generals like Moroni and Lehi were able to hold the day. This was not just because they were great men, but because they were men of God, and led a people who were faithful to God. This is Mormon’s lesson to be learned from these conflicts.

 

Textual: This ends a chapter in the 1830 edition.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

by Brant Gardner. Copyright 2001