Alma 56

Alma 56:1

1 And now it came to pass in the commencement of the thirtieth year of the reign of the judges, on the second day in the first month, Moroni received an epistle from Helaman, stating the affairs of the people in that quarter of the land.

Textual: Mormon begins a new chapter with this verse. He has been ending chapters with a statement of the years. This time he also opens his chapter with a reference to the years. It is probably no coincidence that we see more of the year markers in this section of the Book of Mormon than at any other time. When Mormon is writing this section of his abridgement, he is following a chronology, and the passage of time is part of what is important to this story.

Of course Mormon does not always begin a chapter with the changing of a year. There should also be an ending and a beginning. In this case, the ending was the conclusion of the chapter that focused on Moroni. This chapter begins with, and focuses on, Helaman and his young warriors. The next reason for the shift in chapters is that this is an inserted letter. This letter covers from our chapter 56 to the end of our chapter 58. This is a typical reason for Mormon’s chapter breaks.

Chronological: the thirtieth year of the reign of the judges would be approximately 64 BC.

Alma 56:2

2 And these are the words which he wrote, saying: My dearly beloved brother, Moroni, as well in the Lord as in the tribulations of our warfare; behold, my beloved brother, I have somewhat to tell you concerning our warfare in this part of the land.

Textual: Here begins an inserted letter. The fact that this is a letter once again confirms some level of literacy among the Nephite elite. Of course that is precisely where history tells us that we ought to find literacy. In contrast to the later Maya world where the scribes were apparently a specialized set, possibly the elite who were not in line for the throne, (see Norman Hammond. “Inside the Black Box: Defining Maya Polity.” Classic Maya Political History. Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 264, and William L. Fash. Scribes, Warriors and Kings. Thames and Hudson, 1991, p. 136) in the Nephite world we find a religious leader (Helaman) and a military man (Moroni) who are clearly literate.

We may also learn something from this letter above and beyond the content. We should understand that it must have been written on some type of paper. The length of the letter and the need to carry it to Moroni both counterindicate metal plates. Even thought we know that plates were used, they would have been used in special occasions, and writing letters certainly would not qualify as an occasion warranting the use of metal.

Alma 56:3

3 Behold, two thousand of the sons of those men whom Ammon brought down out of the land of Nephi—now ye have known that these were descendants of Laman, who was the eldest son of our father Lehi;

Alma 56:4

4 Now I need not rehearse unto you concerning their traditions or their unbelief, for thou knowest concerning all these things—

As Helaman begins his letter he reminds Moroni of the nature of the army he is leading. He first refers to them as “two thousand.” As noted in the analysis of “Counts and Estimates,” this is probably a number related to a particular military unit, and probably did not number precisely two thousand young men. There could have been more, but there could easily have been fewer.

In addition to referring to the size of his military unit, Helaman reminds Moroni of what Moroni ought to remember, that these are sons of the people of Ammon, and they are lineal Lamanites. Why does Helaman take the trouble to tell Moroni something that Helaman says he already knows? First, this may simply be a polite reminder, but even more importantly, the lineage connections of these young men provide a tremendous contrast to their actions. Here are lineal Lamanites who will fight valiantly for the Nephite cause.

Alma 56:5

5 Therefore it sufficeth me that I tell you that two thousand of these young men have taken their weapons of war, and would that I should be their leader; and we have come forth to defend our country.

Alma 56:6

6 And now ye also know concerning the covenant which their fathers made, that they would not take up their weapons of war against their brethren to shed blood.

Just as with the Lamanite background of the young men, Helaman indicates that Moroni should be well aware of the importance of them taking up arms. Moroni would know of the covenant of the parents, and know that this is a remarkable occasion. Helaman places this information in the letter as part of the necessary prelude to the actions of these young men. The contrast between their heritage and their actions makes their deeds even more remarkable.

Alma 56:7

7 But in the twenty and sixth year, when they saw our afflictions and our tribulations for them, they were about to break the covenant which they had made and take up their weapons of war in our defence.

Alma 56:8

8 But I would not suffer them that they should break this covenant which they had made, supposing that God would strengthen us, insomuch that we should not suffer more because of the fulfilling the oath which they had taken.

Helaman gives Moroni a historical perspective. These events began four years earlier than the date when this letter is being written. Helaman must write to Moroni about these things because Helaman and his young army have been occupied on the western front, and Moroni has been detained in the east. Thus Helaman and his young army have performed their feats away from Moroni’s presence. While Moroni would surely have been informed of the results of battles, this type of detail would not have been the type of information transmitted at the height of the conflicts.

Alma 56:9

9 But behold, here is one thing in which we may have great joy. For behold, in the twenty and sixth year, I, Helaman, did march at the head of these two thousand young men to the city of Judea, to assist Antipus, whom ye had appointed a leader over the people of that part of the land.

Textual: The separation into verses makes the first phrase of this verse difficult. In what is their joy? If we read verses 8 and 9 together the phrase makes a little more sense, for the joy would then be the resolution of the conflict between the need and the oath, which is the sons taking up arms. The “one thing in which we may have great joy” is that the defense of the nation was assisted without the need of violating a sacred oath.

Geographic: In Sorenson’s mapping of the Book of Mormon cities, Judea would lie upstream from Zarahemla. It creates a barrier to access to Zarahemla from the south through a pass that connects to the city of Antiparah. While not on the direct line between Zarahemla and Manti, it was clearly a city strongly enough defended that it could not be passed by. Thus these young men are being sent into the first defense behind the front lines. This is a critical area because the Lamanite incursion is coming through the valleys from the south and west and are separated from Zarahemla by the strength of Judea.

Alma 56:10

10 And I did join my two thousand sons, (for they are worthy to be called sons) to the army of Antipus, in which strength Antipus did rejoice exceedingly; for behold, his army had been reduced by the Lamanites because their forces had slain a vast number of our men, for which cause we have to mourn.

Helaman is writing after the fact, and these young men had become his sons through the rigors of the battles. They were worthy to be called sons not simply because of their age, but because of their shared closeness of purpose and effort. They arrived in Judea to find a difficult situation, which was the reason that such young men had been recruited in the first place. Not only is Judea a critical strategic location to be held, but in the wars with the Lamanites there had already been a large loss of life. The depletion of the Nephite forces was what led to these young men taking arms at the time of their adopted nation’s need.

Alma 56:11

11 Nevertheless, we may console ourselves in this point, that they have died in the cause of their country and of their God, yea, and they are happy.

Helaman mentions the dead, and then pronounces something good about them. This is a letter of encouragement, and even in this great loss of life Helaman wishes to find something positive. At that point, the positive is their faith, not the military situation.

Alma 56:12

12 And the Lamanites had also retained many prisoners, all of whom are chief captains, for none other have they spared alive. And we suppose that they are now at this time in the land of Nephi; it is so if they are not slain.

Historical: We do not have data for the nature of early warfare. Our best information comes from Aztec times, which post date the Book of Mormon by some six hundred years. We do know that from the times of the Classic Maya through the Aztec domination, there was an increase in the cult of sacrifice, which reached its apogee in the Aztecs. Thus the Aztec penchant of taking as many prisoners as possible may not be the model that is applicable to earlier times. We have seen that the Maya preferred captives of high status, and we see in this verse the capture and retention of the chief captains. These prisoners were sufficiently important that they were returned to the land of Nephi (the homeland of the Lamanites).

The rest of the prisoners were killed. We do not know how they were killed, but it is possible that in the Mesoamerican context in which we are placing the Book of Mormon that they were sacrificed. Even in Aztec times, during a long campaign where they were not returning home, captives would all be sacrificed in the field (Ross Hassig. Aztec Warfare. University of Oklahoma Press, 1988, pp. 115-6). It is possible that this is the reason for the slaughter of the non-elite captives. Not only would this be a religious act of human sacrifice, but one that was pragmatic in that the attacking army did not have to deal with the care and guarding of so many prisoners.

The situation differs from that which we saw on the eastern front where the Lamanites were harboring captives. In that case, the Lamanite armies were bogged down and attempting to hold on to captured cities. In such a case, the captives could be kept for ransom because the army was not on the attack. The western front was more dynamic, and apparently the leaders in charge wanted to keep their ability to move rapidly intact.

Alma 56:13

13 And now these are the cities of which the Lamanites have obtained possession by the shedding of the blood of so many of our valiant men;

Alma 56:14

14 The land of Manti, or the city of Manti, and the city of Zeezrom, and the city of Cumeni, and the city of Antiparah.

Alma 56:15

15 And these are the cities which they possessed when I arrived at the city of Judea; and I found Antipus and his men toiling with their might to fortify the city.

The situation was grave indeed. The cities captured by the Lamanites were the first line of defense between the land of Zarahemla and the land of Nephi. These cities appear to have been established to guard the main valleys that lead into the larger Sidon valley. Between those cities and Zarahemla lay only Judea and Gideon. The military situation is quite desperate.

Alma 56:16

16 Yea, and they were depressed in body as well as in spirit, for they had fought valiantly by day and toiled by night to maintain their cities; and thus they had suffered great afflictions of every kind.

It would appear that Antipus’ troops in Judea consisted of men retreating from the captured cities as well as those who would have been from the land of Judea. The description of their efforts would appear to suggest that they had been working on the defenses of multiple cities, and now have retreated to this single location.

Alma 56:17

17 And now they were determined to conquer in this place or die; therefore you may well suppose that this little force which I brought with me, yea, those sons of mine, gave them great hopes and much joy.

The defenders at Judea were so depleted that the arrival of a contingent of two thousand men, even if they were younger and not trained, was a relief. This should tell us even more of the difficult conditions under which they were laboring, if such untrained, unseasoned troops were the cause of “great hopes and much joy.”

The last information that we have that tells us of the dire circumstances of the city is the statement that they were willing to defend this location or die trying. They realized that they were a key to the defense of the capital, and were willing to give all for the defense of that central point.

Alma 56:18

18 And now it came to pass that when the Lamanites saw that Antipus had received a greater strength to his army, they were compelled by the orders of Ammoron to not come against the city of Judea, or against us, to battle.

Alma 56:19

19 And thus were we favored of the Lord; for had they come upon us in this our weakness they might have perhaps destroyed our little army; but thus were we preserved.

Ammoron receives intelligence that Antipus has been reinforced. We may surmise that his spies were watching from a distance, and from such a distance it would be impossible to tell the age and battle-readiness of Helaman’s troops. We may also surmise that Ammoron’s forces were also somewhat depleted if the addition of the two thousand was enough to tip the balance. Ammoron apparently decides to wait and gain strength rather than attack. This gives both the men of Antipus and Helaman to do the same. At this point, Helaman’s army has been important without even raising a weapon. Their mere arrival bought much needed time.

Alma 56:20

20 They were commanded by Ammoron to maintain those cities which they had taken. And thus ended the twenty and sixth year. And in the commencement of the twenty and seventh year we had prepared our city and ourselves for defence.

Alma 56:21

21 Now we were desirous that the Lamanites should come upon us; for we were not desirous to make an attack upon them in their strongholds.

Ammoron digs in at the cities that had been captured. Antipus and Helaman know they need to confront the Lamanites, but are aware of the dangers of facing them in open battle, or even worse, face them when they were dug into a city’s defenses. They would increase their odds substantially should the Lamanites initiate the attack on Judea.

Alma 56:22

22 And it came to pass that we kept spies out round about, to watch the movements of the Lamanites, that they might not pass us by night nor by day to make an attack upon our other cities which were on the northward.

Alma 56:23

23 For we knew in those cities they were not sufficiently strong to meet them; therefore we were desirous, if they should pass by us, to fall upon them in their rear, and thus bring them up in the rear at the same time they were met in the front. We supposed that we could overpower them; but behold, we were disappointed in this our desire.

Alma 56:24

24 They durst not pass by us with their whole army, neither durst they with a part, lest they should not be sufficiently strong and they should fall.

Antipus is the military mind here. While the information comes form Helaman, it is more likely that the strategic planning came from Antipus. One of the things Antipus hoped was that the Lamanites would attempt to bypass Judea and strike as a lesser city downriver. Antipus kept spies watching for such a move because he wanted to take advantage of that movement and fall in upon the Lamanites from the rear. The Lamanites are learning the dangers of such movements, however, and they do not take that route.

Alma 56:25

25 Neither durst they march down against the city of Zarahemla; neither durst they cross the head of Sidon, over to the city of Nephihah.

Alma 56:26

26 And thus, with their forces, they were determined to maintain those cities which they had taken.

Geographic: The mention of the city of Nephihah at this point as an alternate location for an attack suggests that Nephihah was a location accessible from the Antiparah, Cumeni, Zeezrom, Manti area. Later details suggest that Manti was the closest, and this suggests that Nephihah lay down the Sidon river valley, but on the other side of the river from Zarahemla (that is, on the east side). Nephihah must also be closer to the eastern front, and we will see that refugees from eastern seaboard cities take shelter in Nephihah. All of this appears to suggest that Nephihah lay somewhere upriver from the eastern cities, and downriver from Manti (see John L. Sorenson, An Ancient American Setting for the Book of Mormon. FARMS 1980, p. 241, map 12. Sorenson places Nephihah nearer the eastern seaboard, but this verse suggests it may have been further from the eastern cities and closer to Manti).

Alma 56:27

27 And now it came to pass in the second month of this year, there was brought unto us many provisions from the fathers of those my two thousand sons.

Alma 56:28

28 And also there were sent two thousand men unto us from the land of Zarahemla. And thus we were prepared with ten thousand men, and provisions for them, and also for their wives and their children.

Relief arrives from Zarahemla in the form of another contingent of two thousand men, as well as provisions. In this case, Helaman specifically notes that the provisions were form the fathers of the two thousand “sons” in his unit. The mention of this fact is probably to demonstrate the willingness of those fathers to serve the cause, even if their oath did not let them bear arms. They served by provisioning the armies.

Alma 56:29

29 And the Lamanites, thus seeing our forces increase daily, and provisions arrive for our support, they began to be fearful, and began to sally forth, if it were possible to put an end to our receiving provisions and strength.

The waiting game was turning to the disadvantage of the Lamanites. They send out sorties intended to disrupt the supply lines. If they are to successfully siege the city of Judea, they will need to cut off access, and clearly they had not done that. The text does not indicate a full scale attack here, but rather that they began to “sally forth.” The objective is stated as the disruption of provisions rather than the city itself. The very idea that the Lamanites were now willing to leave their strongholds gives Antipus the opening he had been waiting for.

Alma 56:30

30 Now when we saw that the Lamanites began to grow uneasy on this wise, we were desirous to bring a stratagem into effect upon them; therefore Antipus ordered that I should march forth with my little sons to a neighboring city, as if we were carrying provisions to a neighboring city.

Alma 56:31

31 And we were to march near the city of Antiparah, as if we were going to the city beyond, in the borders by the seashore.

Alma 56:32

32 And it came to pass that we did march forth, as if with our provisions, to go to that city.

Because the Lamanites had begun to harry supply lines, Helaman and his men take on the appearance of just such a supply line. They are not destined for Antiparah, which was a city in Lamanite hands, but rather for an unnamed city beyond Antiparah, simply noted as being “in the borders by the seashore. The route to this unnamed city would require them to pass dangerously close to Antiparah, and it is upon this city that Antipus desires to spring his trap.

Historical: We have seen Moroni execute maneuvers where he drew an army into a situation where they could be ambushed. Antipus attempts the same strategy here. In Mesoamerican combat the combatants were fairly equally matched with arms. The strength of numbers would typically win the day, and in most of the cases in the Book of Mormon, that advantage always lay with the Lamanites. By using various strategies to lure the opposing army into tactically compromised situations, the numerical odds were not only evened, but the advantage could be shifted to the Nephites. The Nephites were not alone in their use of this type of strategy to improve their military odds. The most effective and powerful Mesoamerican military was the Aztec army. Note the description of some of their more important battle tactics:

“Ambushes were among the most successful and skillfully executed of the Aztec tactical maneuvers. They included simple attacks at physically disabling times and locations, such as at narrow mountain passes, where the advantage lay overwhelmingly with the attacker, or from seemingly deserted houses. The most spectacular ambushes, however, were executed in battle and involved use of a feint in which the Aztec forces retreated as if the enemy were winning the struggle. If the feint was executed convincingly, the enemy advanced to press home its advantage. Once the enemy forces had been drawn into a compromised position, the Aztecs turned on them with additional troops, attacked them from behind, or used these troops to cut them off from tactical and logistical support.” (Ross Hassig. Aztec Warfare. University of Oklahoma Press, 1988, p. 103).

The Book of Mormon describes precisely the type of feints and ambushes that were to be later used to great effect by the Aztec military. The descriptions of the battles in the Book of Mormon are quite at home in the Mesoamerican cultural area.

Alma 56:33

33 And it came to pass that Antipus did march forth with a part of his army, leaving the remainder to maintain the city. But he did not march forth until I had gone forth with my little army, and came near the city Antiparah.

The setup of this strategy was to send a believable-looking supply unit to provision the city beyond Antiparah. Since the Lamanites had begun to leave their fortified cities to disrupt the supply lines, they would most likely take the bait and come out against Helaman and his army. Antipus marched out from Judea after enough time had passed that the spies would report Helaman’s column to the leader in Antiparah, but would not notice the movement of Antipus’ men.

Alma 56:34

34 And now, in the city Antiparah were stationed the strongest army of the Lamanites; yea, the most numerous.

Alma 56:35

35 And it came to pass that when they had been informed by their spies, they came forth with their army and marched against us.

There were two reasons that Antipus chose to attempt this strategy against Antiparah. The first was that there was a believable objective that could explain Helaman’s movement around Antiparah. The second is that Antiparah was the location of the strongest Lamanite division. Recapturing Antiparah would not only strengthen the Nephite defenses, but it would mean the destruction of a significant portion of their enemies in that part of the land.

Alma 56:36

36 And it came to pass that we did flee before them, northward. And thus we did lead away the most powerful army of the Lamanites;

When the Lamanites come out to engage them, Helaman and his army turn northward. This would not take them directly back towards Judea, because that would have aroused the suspicion of the pursuing Lamanties. The intent was to lead the Lamanites past a point where Antipus would have been able to arrive and await so that they could fall in upon the Lamanite rear.

Alma 56:37

37 Yea, even to a considerable distance, insomuch that when they saw the army of Antipus pursuing them, with their might, they did not turn to the right nor to the left, but pursued their march in a straight course after us; and, as we suppose, it was their intent to slay us before Antipus should overtake them, and this that they might not be surrounded by our people.

It is important for Helaman to note that the went a “considerable distance.” Had they been very close to Antiparah, the logical thing to do would be to attempt a return to Antiparah where they would not only be accepted into the city, but where reinforcements could come to help turn the tide of the battle. Being far from Antiparah guaranteed that his army of Lamanites was cut off, a fact that they quick recognized.

Even though they have been trapped by a stratagem, we need not suppose that they did not understand the stratagem when it was sprung against them. They understood that the trailing army would probably be bigger than the one they were chasing, and the smaller army ahead of them was intended to turn and harass their rear when they turned to meet the arriving troops. Rather than allow the strategy to unfold as planned, they pushed forward their attack on Helaman’s men to overtake and destroy them. If they accomplished that task, they could then turn to the pursuing Antipus and meet him on a more level strategic position, without the immediate worry of a two-front battle.

Alma 56:38

38 And now Antipus, beholding our danger, did speed the march of his army. But behold, it was night; therefore they did not overtake us, neither did Antipus overtake them; therefore we did camp for the night.

Alma 56:39

39 And it came to pass that before the dawn of the morning, behold, the Lamanites were pursuing us. Now we were not sufficiently strong to contend with them; yea, I would not suffer that my little sons should fall into their hands; therefore we did continue our march, and we took our march into the wilderness.

Helaman gives us an amazingly accurate rendition of the effect of the time of day on this type of pursuit. Here we have three armies moving in the same direction, each with an incentive to move quickly. Nevertheless, when night falls, the pursuit stops, and even the flight stops. Helaman’s troops are in grave danger because he knows that he cannot withstand the Lamanite army that is pursuing them, but he still stops and makes camp. It appears that all armies stopped and made camp. This is an accurate depiction of the difficulties of large-scale movements of troops at night in Mesoamerica. This is an area with few roads, and therefore the armies are marching on uneven terrain with various typical obstacles from natural vegetation and topography. Mesoamerican battles seldom included night maneuvers. However, Mesoamerican battles typically commenced at dawn, and here again we see the accurate depiction of the resumption of the chase at dawn on the next day (see Ross Hassig, 1988, p. 95 for a description or the timing of battles).

Alma 56:40

40 Now they durst not turn to the right nor to the left lest they should be surrounded; neither would I turn to the right nor to the left lest they should overtake me, and we could not stand against them, but be slain, and they would make their escape; and thus we did flee all that day into the wilderness, even until it was dark.

Helaman repeats the idea that they “durst not turn to the right nor to the left” which we also saw in verse 37. This repetition of the same phrase indicates a resumption of the pursuit with the same single-mindedness of purpose as on the previous day. Helaman’s forced march covers another day without an engagement, and they are moving into the wilderness, which is away from any other form of assistance. The only salvation for Helaman’s army will be for the Lamanites to give up, or for Antipus to force the engagement from the rear.

Alma 56:41

41 And it came to pass that again, when the light of the morning came we saw the Lamanites upon us, and we did flee before them.

Once again we have the stopping for the night, and the continuation of the pursuit at the “light of the morning.”

Alma 56:42

42 But it came to pass that they did not pursue us far before they halted; and it was in the morning of the third day of the seventh month.

Alma 56:43

43 And now, whether they were overtaken by Antipus we knew not, but I said unto my men: Behold, we know not but they have halted for the purpose that we should come against them, that they might catch us in their snare;

On the morning of the third day of the pursuit the Lamanites halt. Helaman can see that they are no longer pursued, but he cannot tell why. If the Lamanites have simply given up, they may be attempting a trap of their own to draw Helaman’s men back toward them. The Lamanites surely know what the strategy should have been, that Helaman would attack when Antipus attacked. Since Helaman cannot tell whether or not Antipus is attacking, and indeed it is highly unlikely that he has any idea of where Antipus is, Helaman cannot be certain that the reason they stopped was to face Antipus. If Antipus were too far behind, then the Lamanites could be stopping to make it appear that the strategy was working, and thus lure Helaman into an attack. If Antipus were not at their rear, they could dedicate their entire army to destroying Helaman, and then turn to Antipus, which was the reason for their flight in the first place.

The reason that Helaman cannot tell where Antipus is has to do with the nature of a military march through such rough terrain. Hassig suggests that it is reasonable to assume a square meter of distance between any soldier and his companion in a column. A single column of 8,000 warriors would stretch for 15 miles, and the end of the column could be 6 to 10 hours behind the front of the column (Hassig 1988, p. 67). Of course, this extreme could be ameliorated by having columns march in parallel, and the larger the number of parallel columns, the shorter the line of march. Nevertheless, in the uneven terrain over which this flight has taken place, we cannot suppose an overly wide set of columns. Thus the Lamanite army would stretch for a long distance, probably until the end of visual perception as terrain interrupted the clear vision. Antipus would be some time behind them, and it would not be surprising that the time distance between Antipus and Helaman would be several hours at least by the this time in the chase. Helaman had to make his decision without the advantage of the single piece of information that could have assisted him in his decision, the location of Antipus’ army.

Alma 56:44

44 Therefore what say ye, my sons, will ye go against them to battle?

Alma 56:45

45 And now I say unto you, my beloved brother Moroni, that never had I seen so great courage, nay, not amongst all the Nephites.

Alma 56:46

46 For as I had ever called them my sons (for they were all of them very young) even so they said unto me: Father, behold our God is with us, and he will not suffer that we should fall; then let us go forth; we would not slay our brethren if they would let us alone; therefore let us go, lest they should overpower the army of Antipus.

In this time of indecision, Helaman has two options. He can take advantage of the Lamanite halt to continue to flee, or he can turn on the Lamanites. Flight meant sure salvation. Fight meant possible annihilation. Rather than make this decision himself, Helaman poses the question to these young men. They place their faith in God, and decide to turn to fight.

Alma 56:47

47 Now they never had fought, yet they did not fear death; and they did think more upon the liberty of their fathers than they did upon their lives; yea, they had been taught by their mothers, that if they did not doubt, God would deliver them.

Alma 56:48

48 And they rehearsed unto me the words of their mothers, saying: We do not doubt our mothers knew it.

The mothers of these young men were possessed of a tremendous faith. They had tempered their faith in the face of certain death when their fellow Lamanites had come upon them in the land of Nephi. These mothers had faith in God sufficient to keep their oath to God even when it might have meant their life. That incredibly strong faith was passed on to their sons, but in a slightly different manner. Their mothers had taught them that God would deliver them if they were faithful.

This teaching is so similar to the Nephite foundational promise that we may expect that it is part of that promise. The Lord had promised the people of Lehi that if they were righteous that they would be preserved in the land. This promise was adopted by the Nephites as the one of the fundamental underpinnings of their collective social consciousness. These mothers among the people of Ammon clearly took this promise literally, and impressed it upon their sons. If God had said that his people would be preserved upon righteousness, then their sons would be preserved upon that same righteousness.

Certainly the sons had no doubt that their mothers knew faith, for they had certainly been told the stories of the faith of their parents in the land of Nephi, a faith that was reaffirmed in the difficult decision to maintain their oath even in the face of such great need. The tremendous faith of their parents was what led these sons into battle in the first place, and they were willing to continue to act upon that faith which they had learned at their mothers’ knees.

Alma 56:49

49 And it came to pass that I did return with my two thousand against these Lamanites who had pursued us. And now behold, the armies of Antipus had overtaken them, and a terrible battle had commenced.

When Helaman’s force turns to face the Lamanites, he finds that Antipus had arrived at the rear of the Lamanites and had engaged them. Thus the strategy of Antipus had eventually worked. The problem now was that the strategy had worked much later than expected, and the forced marches were going to add to the difficulties of battle.

Alma 56:50

50 The army of Antipus being weary, because of their long march in so short a space of time, were about to fall into the hands of the Lamanites; and had I not returned with my two thousand they would have obtained their purpose.

Helaman is generous to the forces of Antipus. He allows that they were being defeated because of their forced march. Of course the Lamanites had also been on a similar forced march, though it is probably that the Nephites had to move faster than the Lamanites. In any case, the Lamanite army likely outnumbered Antipus, and the combination of the numbers and the extra fatigue was beginning to swing the tide of battle to the Lamanites. It was at this point that Helaman arrives to press the attack on what is now the Lamanite rear. This will engage another sector of the Lamanite army, and prevent them from bringing more fresh troops to the front where the hand-to-hand combat was the most physically draining. With the need to fight on two fronts, the Lamanite superiority in numbers is now ameliorated because the reserves are also engaged.

Alma 56:51

51 For Antipus had fallen by the sword, and many of his leaders, because of their weariness, which was occasioned by the speed of their march—therefore the men of Antipus, being confused because of the fall of their leaders, began to give way before the Lamanites.

The loss of their general sends the troops into disarray. In this case, they do not surrender as we have seen before, but their organization is disrupted and the Lamanites are pressing their advantage. Hassig explains the way in which the loss of the identifiable leader would lead to such confusion:

“Sound devices were effective in signaling the armies' advance, but warriors of each unit entered battle shouting the name of their town and beating their shields with their swords, so such devices were ineffective for maneuvers during the engagement. For that, tall cuachpantli standards were used. Unit leaders wore standards and led their troops into battle. If the cuachpantli bearer was killed or the standard was taken, the unit was thrown into disarray, and the Spaniards reasoned that the Indian warriors fled because losing

their standard was an evil omen. Actually, this disarray was caused by more pragmatic considerations. Because the noise and confusion in battle made it impossible to rely on audible commands, sight was used, and the standard, towering above the fray, provided an easy sign indicating where and when the unit was advancing and retreating. Individuals and groups could keep in touch with their main body simply by observing the standard. And though the loss of the standard and the leader carrying it no doubt proved a major psychological blow to the rest of the unit, this setback was secondary to the loss of direction. Without the standard soldiers could not determine where their comrades were going, and they risked being cut off and captured by the enemy. The consternation shown by the army units had real tactical significance, and the loss of the standard-bearer did not mean divine displeasure and lead to dispersion; rather, it disrupted control and blinded the troops.” (Hassig, 1988, p. 96).

While the Book of Mormon battles do not describe such standards, this is precisely the type of detail that Mormon might assume that everyone would know, and not be worth mentioning. What we can tell is that the loss of the leader had the effect of sending the troops into disarray in the Book of Mormon just as Hassig describes. The Book of Mormon troops would have had to cope with the same issues of control in a battle, and it is most likely that we see in this description the circumstantial evidence that allows us to posit the leader as a standard-bearer, just as occurred in the later Aztec military.

Alma 56:52

52 And it came to pass that the Lamanites took courage, and began to pursue them; and thus were the Lamanites pursuing them with great vigor when Helaman came upon their rear with his two thousand, and began to slay them exceedingly, insomuch that the whole army of the Lamanites halted and turned upon Helaman.

The engagement of Helaman’s troops has the desired effect of changing the objectives of the Lamantie troops. They may no longer commit fully to fighting Antipus because they must also deal with Helaman. One of the ways in which a numerically superior force would fight a smaller one was to extend the line of battle so that greater numbers of fighters could engage at one time (Hassig, 1988, p. 101). When Helaman attacks, the Lamanites cannot use their greater numbers to widen the front against the army of Antipus because they must now dedicate fighters to the rear as well. The necessity of fighting on two fronts tended to compact the line of engagement, and even out the forces that would come face to face.

Alma 56:53

53 Now when the people of Antipus saw that the Lamanites had turned them about, they gathered together their men and came again upon the rear of the Lamanites.

We do not know how the Nephites were able to understand both the change in their situation and the necessity of moving to fight the Lamanites. Certainly there were smaller divisions in the army that retained their leaders, and those leaders understood what should happen in this strategy. It would appear that sufficient numbers of them recognized the change in battle status, and their efforts to turn to fight were seen by their own unit, and the others. Thus even though there was no longer a single standard-bearer, the smaller units were able to press the initial strategy.

Alma 56:54

54 And now it came to pass that we, the people of Nephi, the people of Antipus, and I with my two thousand, did surround the Lamanites, and did slay them; yea, insomuch that they were compelled to deliver up their weapons of war and also themselves as prisoners of war.

The strategy works, though at quite a toll among the army of Antipus, with Antipus himself among the casualties. The end result, however, is that the Lamanites suffer large losses, and eventually surrender. The objective has been reached, though not without heroic and desperate struggle. Each army has used the best options available to them in this type of a war, and the turning point is the decision of Helaman’s young men to enter the battle, even though they had never fought before.

Alma 56:55

55 And now it came to pass that when they had surrendered themselves up unto us, behold, I numbered those young men who had fought with me, fearing lest there were many of them slain.

Alma 56:56

56 But behold, to my great joy, there had not one soul of them fallen to the earth; yea, and they had fought as if with the strength of God; yea, never were men known to have fought with such miraculous strength; and with such mighty power did they fall upon the Lamanites, that they did frighten them; and for this cause did the Lamanites deliver themselves up as prisoners of war.

The faith of the young men was justified. While there were many injured, there were none lost. This was near miraculous given the inexperience of the army. Hand-to-hand combat frequently was decided on the skill of the men wielding the weapons, and these young men could not have had the skill of their adversaries. What they did have was their youth, and perhaps speed and stamina. They might have been able to deflect the more dangerous blows, and thus there were many wounded, but none lost.

Alma 56:57

57 And as we had no place for our prisoners, that we could guard them to keep them from the armies of the Lamanites, therefore we sent them to the land of Zarahemla, and a part of those men who were not slain of Antipus, with them; and the remainder I took and joined them to my stripling Ammonites, and took our march back to the city of Judea.

At the end of this battle, Helaman sends the captured Lamanites to Zarahemla. He and the remainder of Antipus’ army return to Judea. Since they had left that city to pursue this combat, its defenses had been somewhat compromised, and it was important to strengthen them.

Textual: There is no chapter break at this point in the 1830 text. The reason is that Helaman’s letter is continued in the next chapter, and Mormon treats that entire epistle as a chapter.